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Attachment

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File

11/17/61  
6/26

September 29, 1961

STATUS OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING

64

The attached paper supersedes the paper distributed September 13.

It contains the following additions to or revisions of the earlier paper:

1. A list of contingencies constituting a table of contents.
2. A revision of Section III on Harassment within Berlin.
3. A new Annex (D).

Sections I and II are in process of revision and the paper will be reissued again incorporating any necessary changes when the process has been completed.

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STATUS OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING

## Quadripartite Contingency Coordinating Subgroup

The attached chart is a working draft prepared for the use of the Subgroup. It has not been approved by any Government represented on the Subgroup, although it reflects Government positions where specifically indicated.

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10/4/65  
(9)  
PLORD 9-19-60  
TAB 25

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PLORD  
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Contingencies Covered in the Chart  
(as they appear in the left-hand column of the chart)

I. Interference with Air Access to Berlin . . . . .	1
A. Minor harassments. . . . .	1
B. Actions likely to have the effect of terminating civil airline operations. . . . .	1
1. Administrative. . . . .	1
2. Use of force. . . . .	3
C. Interference with military air transport, civil airline operations having ceased. . . . .	3
D. Halting of military transport, ground access still being open . . . . .	5
E. Determined efforts to interdict military transport, <u>ground access being closed</u> . . . . .	6
II. Interference with Ground Access to Berlin . . . . .	7
A. Interference with Allied traffic but not German civilian traffic. . . . .	7
1. Harassments short of blockage . . . . .	7
2. Blockage of Allied road or rail access through introduction of unacceptable controls. . . . .	8
3. Blockage of Allied road or rail access by forcible closure. . . . .	9
4. Blockage of Allied road and rail access by any means, air access being open. . . . .	10
5. Blockage of Allied road and rail access by any means, <u>air access being closed</u> . . . . .	10
B. Interference with German but not Allied ground access. . . . .	11
1. Harassments short of blockage. . . . .	11
2. Blockage of rail, road or barge traffic or two or all of them. . . . .	12

C Blockage



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Contingencies Covered in the Chart  
(as they appear in the left-hand column of the chart)

I. Interference with Air Access to Berlin . . . . .	1
A. Minor harassments. . . . .	1
B. Actions likely to have the effect of terminating civil airline operations. . . . .	1
1. Administrative. . . . .	1
2. Use of force. . . . .	3
C. Interference with military air transport, civil airline operations having ceased. . . . .	3
D. Halting of military transport, ground access still being open . . . . .	5
E. Determined efforts to interdict military transport, <u>ground access being closed</u> . . . . .	6
II. Interference with Ground Access to Berlin . . . . .	7
A. Interference with Allied traffic but not German civilian traffic. . . . .	7
1. Harassments short of blockage . . . . .	7
2. Blockage of Allied road or rail access through introduction of unacceptable controls. . . . .	8
3. Blockage of Allied road or rail access by forcible closure. . . . .	9
4. Blockage of Allied road and rail access by any means, air access being open. . . . .	10
5. Blockage of Allied road and rail access by any means, <u>air access being closed</u> . . . . .	10
B. Interference with German but not Allied ground access. . . . .	11
1. Harassments short of blockage. . . . .	11
2. Blockage of rail, road or barge traffic or two or all of them. . . . .	12

C Blockage

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A. Interference with Allied access to East Berlin. . . . .	15
1. Harassment but not denial of Allied access to East Berlin. . . . .	15
2. Denial of Allied access to East Berlin . . . . .	17
B. Interference with West German and West Berliner access to East Berlin. . . . .	20
1. Further restriction on but not denial of entry of West Germans and West Berliners into East Berlin. . . . .	20
2. Denial of entry of West Germans and West Berliners into East Berlin. . . . .	20
C. Harassment of or attack upon West Berlin. . . . .	21
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IV. Soviet Political Moves . . . . .	32
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B. Signature of a "peace treaty." . . . .	32
C. Turnover of access control to the GDR. . . . .	32

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Mirror Countermeasures	Annex A
Major Countermeasures	Annex B
Countermeasures for Interference with Air Access	Annex C
The Interzonal Trade Agreement	Annex D

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Mirror Countermeasures

Annex A

Major Countermeasures

Annex B

Countermeasures for Interference with Air Access

Annex C

The Interzonal Trade Agreement

Annex D

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Incidents in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
1. <u>Access to Berlin</u>				
a. Minor Harassments				
Continued Soviet/GDR demands that Allied traffic be limited to Allied garrison needs	Rejection on the grounds that Allied use of the corridors is unrestricted.	None	Agreed among Four Powers (set forth in Aug. 20 Three Power notes to USSR)	The treaty of 1945 and 1948 assumes that access is still open.
Request that Allied planes report to GDR radio station in accordance with GDR radio law of Aug. 1, 1950	Civil airline pilots reply when queried by GDR radio that they are on ATO-controlled flight. Military pilots make no reply.	None	Agreed among the Three Powers	Section 1 of treaty case of attempts to halt air traffic, access already being closed.
b. Actions likely to have the effect of terminating civil airline operations.				
1. <u>Administrative</u>	In general, if airlines cease to fly for any of the reasons set forth in this section, military transport will be substituted at once, without fighter escort.	Protest initially by Allied controllers to NASC, possibly followed by protest to Soviet Government	The response is agreed to tripartitely. The countermeasure is not explicitly agreed to.	Whether or not airlines cease to fly as a result of these measures will depend in some degree on the degree of insistence of GDR/Soviet authorities. The US and UK Air Forces can be expected not to include a demand for interference for non-compliance. Air Force may continue to fly to the point of actual physical interference.
GDR demand that airlines register their radios under the August 1 law.	This demand should be rejected with the argument that Allied flights in the corridors are not subject to any form of GDR control.	Protest to Soviet Controller. A protest to the Soviet Government if non-compliance is declared punishable by physical interference.	This specific question has not been considered, but a decision should be reached on the response.	
Soviet/GDR insistence that commercial air operations are distinct from Allied military operations. In the subject of regular agreements	This demand should be rejected, since all Allied air operations have an equal right in the corridors.	Protest to Soviet Controller. A protest to the Soviet Government if non-compliance is declared to be punishable by physical interference.	No specific decision has been reached on the response; this is inherent in the Allied position regarding use of the corridors.	The Germans would not have countermeasures applied at this time.

## Corridors in the Crisis

## Responses

## Countermeasures

## Status of Decision

## Comments

1. Access to Berlin  
access to Berlin

## a. Minor Harassments

Continued Soviet/GDR demands that Allied traffic be limited to Allied garrison needs

Rejection on the grounds that Allied use of the corridors is unrestricted. None

Agreed among Four Powers (set forth in Aug. 26 Three Power notes to USSR)

The treatment of 1 A-D assumes that access is still open

Request that Allied planes report to GDR radio station in accordance with GDR radio law of Aug. 1, 1951

Civil airline pilots reply when queried by GDR radio that they are on ATC-controlled flight. Military pilots make no reply. None

Agreed among the Three Powers

Section 1.2 treats case of attempts to halt air traffic. Access already being closed.

2. Actions likely to have the effect of terminating civil airline operations.

a. Administrative

In general, if airlines cease to fly for any of the reasons set forth in this section, military transport will be substituted at once, without fighter escort.

Protest initially by Allied controllers to BASC, possibly followed by protest to Soviet Government

The response is agreed to tripartitely. The countermeasure is not explicitly agreed to

Whether or not airlines cease to fly as a result of these measures will depend in some cases on degree of insistence of GDR/Soviet authorities. The US and UK Air Forces can be expected not to include a threat of physical interference for non-compliance. Air Force may continue to fly to the point of actual physical interference.

GDR demand that airlines register their radios under the August 1 law.

This demand should be rejected with the argument that Allied flights in the corridors are not subject to any form of GDR control

Protest to Soviet Controller. A protest to the Soviet Government if non-compliance is declared punishable by physical interference.

This specific question has not been considered, but a decision should be reached on the response.

Soviet/GDR insistence that commercial air operations be distinct from Allied military operations. In the subject of regular agreements

This demand should be rejected, since all Allied air operations have an equal right in the corridors.

Protest to Soviet Controller. A protest to the Soviet Government if non-compliance is declared to be punishable by physical interference.

No specific decision has been reached on the response; this is inherent in the Allied position regarding use of the corridors.

The Germans would not have countermeasures applied at this time.



Development in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	State of D.	
1. (Continued) Soviet refusal to guarantee flight safety for a particular flight or flights.	Three responses are possible: 1. Continue if possible to operate civil airlines; 2. Replace the particular flight or flights with military transport; 3. Determine that civil air operations are no longer safe and substitute military transport entirely.	A protest to the Soviet Controller, possibly followed by protest to Soviet Government.	This specific question has not been the subject of a decision with respect to the response to be made. Much will depend on the circumstances of the event, but a general determination might well be made in advance.	In the event, the particularly Pan Am or BEA, might refuse further flights, then the decision out of Government hands.
Soviet refusal to guarantee flight safety of further flights.	Substitute military air transport if the Civil airlines refuse to continue flying. No fighter protection.	Same as above.	This decision has been made tripartitely.	It may well be that France will continue Pan American and BEA, almost certainly not.
Soviet withdrawal from BASC.	Same response as above. In addition, the contingency plans for relaying flight information to the GDR will be executed.	Same as above. In addition, a public statement will be issued.	This decision has been made tripartitely. Although the public statement is not explicitly provided for a draft which is quadripartitely approved.	Same comment as above. This eventuality could occur at any time as a deliberate Soviet move to end civil air transport as a retaliation for restriction movement of Soviet persons in West Berlin, etc. will almost certainly occur. In any case, the Soviets sign a treaty with the GDR.
A number of possible actions are open to the GDR/Soviets whereby the corridors would be declared unsafe for use without an explicit barring of flights. An announcement of maneuvers or anti-aircraft firing practice in the area are typical.	A possible response would be to insist on alternate routes on the grounds that our basic right is air access <u>not</u> to and not these corridors. Whether military air transport would be substituted would depend on the estimated degree of danger and the reaction of the airlines. Airlines might agree to a non-passenger probe flight.	A protest to the Soviet Controller or the Soviet Government, depending on the seriousness.  Issuance of a public statement.	A decision as to whether our legal position justifies a demand for alternate routes should be made. Otherwise, the method should be left until the particular situation develops.	

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2 Use of Force

By this is meant the forcing down of an aircraft while it is in flight by any means; the shooting down of an aircraft, the firing upon an aircraft with evident intent to shoot it down; forcing it off course

Military air transport would be substituted, accompanied by fighter escort. An announcement would be made at once of our intention to do this. If intent to interfere with the aircraft is unclear, an unaccompanied probe by a military transport might be considered.

Immediate appeal to the United Nations Security Council.

Economic Countermeasures  
(Annex C)

The substitution of military transport is accepted in principle tripartitely. The decision on fighter escort is subject to minor differences on timing and on the definition of an incident sufficient to bring this response. These are being discussed in LIVE OAK. The appropriate countermeasures are under study in the contingency coordinating committee.

An automatic approach to the Security Council has been agreed to by the UK and Germany. The French do not wish to make an advance commitment to associate themselves but have no objection to the others proceeding. The US would wish to go at once to the Council if it is understood another government intended to take the issue to the UN. Otherwise it would want to review the matter in the light of the situation at the time.

Interference with military air transport, civil air operations having ceased

1. Attack upon an unescorted transport

The response would be the same as in B2 above, except that substitution of military transport will already have taken place. The pilot of the attacked plane will have

The same as in B2 above

The same as in B2 above, except that the alternative courses of action open to the pilot are so far clearly established only for US aircraft.

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Incidents in the Crisis	Response	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
(Continued)				
1. Attack upon an escorted aircraft by other aircraft	the option of proceeding, returning to his point of departure, or landing at a GDR/East Berlin airfield	Protecting fighter aircraft may take aggressive protective measures against the attacking force during the course of the attack, including if necessary and feasible immediate pursuit into hostile airspace. Such pursuit will not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile airspace. Commanders are not authorized deliberately and systematically to organize a pursuing force. Pilots will not persist in the attack when it is clear the hostile aircraft has withdrawn and the safety of Allied personnel and aircraft is insured.	The question will presumably already have been brought to the Security Council and countermeasures will presumably already be in effect. Consideration will have to be given to further action along these lines.	These rules of engagement are applicable at present, so far as is known, only to US aircraft. The question of coordination with British and French instructions will have to be examined.
2. Attack upon an escorted aircraft by ground fire	Aircraft under attack will take evasive action and withdraw.	Same as in C2 above.	Same as in C2 above.	

Incidents in the Crisis	Response	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
(Continued)				
2. Attack upon an escorted aircraft by other aircraft	<p>the option of proceeding, returning to his point of departure, or landing at a GDR/East Berlin airfield</p> <p>Protecting fighter aircraft may take aggressive protective measures against the attacking force during the course of the attack, including if necessary and feasible immediate pursuit into hostile airspace. Such pursuit will not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile airspace. Commanders are not authorized deliberately and systematically to organize a pursuing force. Pilots will not persist in the attack when it is clear the hostile aircraft has withdrawn and the safety of Allied personnel and aircraft is insured.</p>	<p>The question will presumably already have been brought to the Security Council and countermeasures will presumably already be in effect. Consideration will have to be given to further action along these lines.</p>	<p>These rules of engagement are applicable at present, so far as is known, only to US aircraft. The question of coordination with British and French instructions will have to be examined.</p>	
3. Attack upon an escorted aircraft by ground fire	<p>Aircraft under attack will take evasive action and withdraw.</p>	<p>Same as in C2 above.</p>	<p>Same as in C2 above.</p>	

Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>Halting of military transport, (ground access still being open). This would probably occur in the form of a Soviet or GDR statement prohibiting flights under present conditions, followed by destruction of any flight sent through. This could constitute the first attempt at physical interference with an aircraft (either civil or military) or could follow other incidents which themselves would have brought about certain countermeasures (See B2 above.)</p>		<p>If this is the first instance of physical interference, we would not yet have gone to the UN on this matter. Approach to the Security Council at least would thus take place.</p>		
		<p>If an earlier incident had caused the matter to be taken to the Security Council, the question would arise whether to return to that body, go to the General Assembly or not return to the UN at all. This would depend to an extent on the outcome of the earlier approach.</p>	<p>The question of approaches to the UN subsequent to an initial approach has not been examined in detail. Since so much would depend on the outcome of the initial approach, a precise advance decision on this point would appear not to be practicable.</p>	
		<p>Countermeasures amounting to a total economic embargo against the Soviet bloc will be taken. See Annex B for a list of the specific measures envisaged (these are the measures in Annex A of the Paris Working Group report.)</p>	<p>The countermeasures were agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961.</p>	



Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>Halting of military transport, (ground access still being open). This would probably occur in the form of a Soviet or GDR statement prohibiting flights under present conditions, followed by destruction of any flight sent through. This could constitute the first attempt at physical interference with an aircraft (either civil or military) or could follow other incidents which themselves would have brought about certain countermeasures (See B2 above.)</p>		<p>If this is the first instance of physical interference, we would not yet have gone to the UN on this matter. Approach to the Security Council at least would thus take place.</p>		
		<p>If an earlier incident had caused the matter to be taken to the Security Council, the question would arise whether to return to that body, go to the General Assembly or not return to the UN at all. This would depend to an extent on the outcome of the earlier approach.</p>	<p>The question of approaches to the UN subsequent to an initial approach has not been examined in detail. Since so much would depend on the outcome of the initial approach, a precise advance decision on this point would appear not to be practicable.</p>	
		<p>Countermeasures amounting to a total economic embargo against the Soviet bloc will be taken. See Annex B for a list of the specific measures envisaged (these are the measures in Annex A of the Paris Working Group report.)</p>	<p>The countermeasures were agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August 1961.</p>	



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<u>Development in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1. Intermittent efforts to interdict military transport, <u>ground access being closed</u> .	Once it is clear that the Soviets intend to prevent military transport from operating, Allied activity directed ultimately toward persuading or forcing the Soviets to resume ground access will intensify.	<p>If both Allied and German ground access are closed, an economic embargo will already be in effect as a result. Additional countermeasures (such as a naval blockade for example) should be considered.</p> <p>If only Allied ground access is closed, the lesser economic countermeasures which would be in effect for that reason would be increased to an economic embargo.</p>	Possible additional countermeasures are the subject of study in the Contingency Coordinating Committee.	If ground access has been closed, it is to be assumed military transport will be the principal vehicle of access. Thus the final attempt to blockade Berlin is likely to take the form of attack on military transport.

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Development in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
<p>Intervined efforts to interdict military transport <u>ground access being closed</u></p>	<p>Once it is clear that the Soviets intend to prevent military transport from operating Allied activity directed ultimately toward persuading or forcing the Soviets to reopen ground access will intensify</p>	<p>If both Allied and German ground access are closed an economic embargo will already be in effect as a result. Additional countermeasures (such as a naval blockade for example) should be considered.</p> <p>If only Allied ground access is closed the lesser economic countermeasures which would be in effect for that reason would be increased to an economic embargo</p>	<p>Possible additional countermeasures are the subject of study in the Contingency Coordinating Committee</p>	<p>If ground access has been closed it is to be assumed military transport will be the principal vehicle of access. Thus the final attempt to blockade Berlin is likely to take the form of attack on military transport</p>

Incidents in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
Interference with ground access to Berlin				
A. Interference with Allied traffic, but not German civilian traffic, by Soviets or by GDR (the latter presumably after signature of a peace treaty).				
1. Blockade or short of blockage.				
Administrative slow-down of processing of road and rail traffic.	Accept slow-down unless it is so serious as to constitute, in effect, blockage of access. In such a case we should consider resorting to garrison airlift.	Protest to Marshorst or Soviet Government, depending on gravity. If a garrison airlift is instituted, the economic countermeasures mentioned under II A 2 should be introduced.	No specific decisions are recorded, and it might be well to agree on the general lines of handling such incidents, particularly with respect to imposition by GDR.	Many of such incidents have been experienced over the years at the hands of the Soviets. They will have a more serious implication, however, if they are applied in the GDR after transfer to West Germany of the checkpoints. In the latter event, they would likely be the beginning of a rising scale of harassment leading toward control of allied government.
Demand for payment of road tolls (such as West German toll pay).	Refuse to pay tolls.	Same as above.	Same as above.	
Attempt to search or exercise other controls over vehicles.	Refuse to permit search or other such controls.	Same as above.	Same as above.	
Impose "safety" or other regulations on highways or railroads requiring vehicles or trains to meet particular "standards" (e.g., registered, etc).	Refuse to comply, on the grounds that vehicles are not subject to Soviet or GDR control.	Same as above.	Same as above.	



Incidents in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
Interference with ground access to Berlin				
A. Interference with Allied traffic, but not German civilian traffic, by Soviets or by GDR (the latter presumably after signature of a peace treaty).				
1. Blockade or short of blockage.				
Administrative slow-down of processing of road and rail traffic.	Accept slow-down unless it is so serious as to constitute, in effect, blockage of access. In such a case we should consider resorting to garrison airlift.	Protest to Marshorst or Soviet Government, depending on gravity. If a garrison airlift is instituted, the economic countermeasures mentioned under II A 2 should be introduced.	No specific decisions are recorded, and it might be well to agree on the general lines of handling such incidents, particularly with respect to imposition by GDR.	Many of such incidents have been experienced over the years at the hands of the Soviets. They will have a more serious implication, however, if they are applied in the GDR after transfer to West Germany of the checkpoints. In the latter event, they would likely be the beginning of a rising scale of harassment leading toward control of allied government.
Demand for payment of road tolls (such as West German toll pay).	Refuse to pay tolls.	Same as above.	Same as above.	
Attempt to search or exercise other controls over vehicles.	Refuse to permit search or other such controls.	Same as above.	Same as above.	
Impose "safety" or other regulations on highways or railroads requiring vehicles or trains to meet particular "standards" (e.g. registered, etc).	Refuse to comply, on the grounds that vehicles are not subject to Soviet or GDR control.	Same as above.	Same as above.	



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<u>Stimulus</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<p>1. Persistent harassment over a period of time severely hampering Allied access</p>	<p>Accept harassment</p>	<p>Apply selective countermeasures of the sort listed in Annex <u>A</u></p>	<p>No decision has been made on use of countermeasures in this eventuality. It would be well to have a decision in principle, based on the list in Annex <u>A</u></p>	<p>they would consider blockage through institution of unacceptable controls (see Section II 42). Severe countermeasures would expose us to a risk of complete blockage of Allied access, but the lack of them might alienate the Soviets into believing the Allies are not serious about defending their publicly announced right of transit. It is within the power of the Soviets and the GDR to make transit as difficult as to of little value. Such an eventuality of limited countermeasures would seem desirable.</p>
<p>2. Blockage of Allied road or rail access through introduction of unacceptable controls by the Soviets or GDR, air access being still open.</p>	<p>When the control is announced, a protestant should be presented at the checkpoint. If the control is affirmed by the Soviet or GDR personnel the Allied personnel should insist on their right to pass on the basis of earlier procedures. If the demand for control is</p>	<p>Economic countermeasures of a degree less than complete embargo will be taken possibly together with non-economic countermeasures. A list of suitable measures is attached at Annex <u>B</u></p> <p>Approach to the Security Council</p>	<p>This response was embodied in the revisions of the contingency plan in connection with takeover of checkpoints</p> <p>The question of whether economic countermeasures should</p>	<p>It would not be wise to elaborate on the precise nature of controls which will be introduced by the GDR or, more likely, the USSR after signing of a treaty. There are a great many which can be used.</p>

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<u>Stimulus</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<p>1. Persistent harassment over a period of time severely hampering Allied access</p>	<p>Accept harassment</p>	<p>Apply selective countermeasures of the sort listed in Annex <u>A</u></p>	<p>No decision has been made on use of countermeasures in this eventuality. It would be well to have a decision in principle, based on the list in Annex <u>A</u></p>	<p>they would consider blockage through institution of unacceptable controls (see Section II 42). Severe countermeasures would expose us to a risk of complete blockage of Allied access, but the lack of them might alienate the Soviets into believing the Allies are not serious about defending their publicly announced right of transit. It is within the power of the Soviets and the GDR to make transit as difficult as to of little value. Such an eventuality of limited countermeasures would seem desirable.</p>
<p>2. Blockage of Allied road or rail access through introduction of unacceptable controls by the Soviets or GDR, air access being still open.</p>	<p>When the control is announced, a protestant should be presented at the checkpoint. If the control is affirmed by the Soviet or GDR personnel the Allied personnel should insist on their right to pass on the basis of earlier procedures. If the demand for control is</p>	<p>Economic countermeasures of a degree less than complete embargo will be taken possibly together with non-economic countermeasures. A list of suitable measures is attached at Annex <u>B</u></p> <p>Approach to the Security Council</p>	<p>This response was embodied in the revisions of the contingency plan in connection with the transfer of checkpoints to the GDR, now approved by Government.</p> <p>The question of whether economic countermeasures should</p>	<p>It would not be wise to elaborate on the precise nature of controls which will be introduced by the GDR or, more likely, the USSR after signing of a treaty. There are a great many which can be used.</p>

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Development in the Crisis

Response

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

maintained, the movement should withdraw and report to the Allied military authorities

Military activity will have to be considered of a nature which, if blockade persists, would involve the use of force.  
(See II A 5)

circumstances was left open by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August, 1961

A decision will be required as to whether the halted traffic will be carried by the alternate ground route or by an airlift.

The question of approaching the UN at this stage has not been decided upon. Advance consideration should be given to doing so.

7. Blockade of Allied road or rail access by forcible closure of line or other routes, air access being still open. By this is meant the flat refusal of the Soviets or GDR to permit passage over a route.

Same as II A 2

Same as II A 2

Same as II A 2

8. Closing of the Autobahn on grounds that repairs are needed. This is a special case with respect to our initial response.

State that we expect our rights of road access will be met by the provision of another route while repairs are being made. If this is refused, the measures described in II A 2 should be taken.

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Development in the Crisis

Response

Countermeasures

Status of Decision

Comments

maintained, the movement should withdraw and report to the Allied military authorities

Military activity will have to be considered of a nature which, if blockade persists, would involve the use of force.  
(See II A 5)

circumstances was left open by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in August, 1961

A decision will be required as to whether the halted traffic will be carried by the alternate ground route or by an airlift.

The question of approaching the UN at this stage has not been decided upon. Advance consideration should be given to doing so.

7. Blockade of Allied road or rail access by forcible closure of line or other routes, air access being still open. By this is meant the flat refusal of the Soviets or GDR to permit passage over a route.

Same as II A 2

Same as II A 2

Same as II A 2

8. Closing of the Autobahn on grounds that repairs are needed. This is a special case with respect to our initial response.

State that we expect our rights of road access will be met by the provision of another route while repairs are being made. If this is refused, the measures described in II A 2 should be taken.

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Situation in the Crisis	Response	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
1. Blockade of Allied road and rail access by air, sea, air access (believe none)	Offer to travel the road. Appropriate responses are given in II A 3 and 4 above. Institution of a partition barrier.	See II A 2.	Decision on response and countermeasures given in II A 2.	A specific decision to use Air Task 4 (yours) envisaged a specific airlift in these circumstances has not been made. It can be said to the extent, since the plan is to implement it.
2. Blockade of Allied road and rail access by air, sea, air access (believe none)	Even though German ground access would still be open, our basic interests would be gravely injured. We would then undertake active military operations in an effort to open access on the ground.	General mobilization An economic embargo would be in effect and we would have taken the issue at an earlier stage in the UN Security Council. An appeal to the General Assembly would have to be considered. UN cancellation should be deferred for a reasonable time. For reaching and covering countermeasures on a world-wide scale would be initiated (see Annex 1).	A decision on the timing of mobilization has not been made. The timing and nature of Allied Military operations generally remain to be settled (this is applicable both to the response and countermeasures). As to the nature of these operations, such planning has been done and more is in progress. Immediate government approval has been given to a number of plans, or later, if the execution would not be automatic but subject to decision by governments in the light of existing circumstances at the time. General N-ated has been	It is not likely to expect that the Soviets will attempt access by air, sea, or land. It is to be expected that countermeasures of military operations will be in progress. General N-ated has been

Situation in the Crisis	Response	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
1. Blockade of Allied road and rail access by air, sea, air access (believe none)	Offer in 1941 (see above)  Appropriate responses are given in II A 3 and 4 above.  Institution of a partition barrier	See II A 2	Decision on response and countermeasures given in II A 2	A specific decision to use Air Task 4 (yours) envisaged a partition airlift in these circumstances has not been made. It can be said to the extent, since the plan is to implement it.  envisaged a partition airlift at the time. It was impossible to access. Implementation was left to a decision at the time.
2. Blockade of Allied road and rail access by air, sea, air access (believe none)	Even though German ground access would still be open, our basic interests would be gravely injured. We would then undertake active military operations in an effort to open access on the ground.	General mobilization  An economic embargo would be in effect and we would have taken the issue at an earlier stage in the UN Security Council. An appeal to the General Assembly would have to be considered. UN cancellation should be deferred for a reasonable time. For reaching and covering countermeasures on a world-wide scale would be initiated (see Annex 1)	A decision on the timing of mobilization has not been made. The timing and nature of Allied Military operations generally remain to be settled (this is applicable both to the immediate and longer term). As to the nature of these operations, such planning has been done and more is in progress. Immediate government approval has been given to a number of plans, or later, if the execution would not be automatic but subject to decision by governments in the light of existing circumstances at the time. General N-ated has been	It is not likely to expect that the Soviets will attempt access by air, sea, or land. It is to be expected that countermeasures of military operations will be in progress. General N-ated has been

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Additional information regarding this report may be obtained from the following sources:

- (1) The National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.
- (2) The Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C.

2000-2001  
January 2001 - April 2001  
May 2001 - August 2001

1. Replenishment short  
of storage. There  
are a number of  
examples the EDC can  
take in this field.  
Their effect is to  
allow growth in  
total capital, but  
without and in-  
crease.

Access such barriers  
leads up to the point  
that access is for all  
useful purposes etc

Perfect statement by  
German Government on  
such occasion of signi-  
cant importance.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific information required.

The principal question involved here, which has not definitely been asked, is whether the use of literature in any case is more desirable in German systems. After adjustment of this and a little at some stage, a general socialist principle in this sense would be useful.



Continued on the reverse page

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Continued on the reverse page

transmitted to various  
existing plans and oper-  
ations and submit for  
interim approval  
several additional plans  
which are being instructed  
to be completed by the  
end of August 1951.

The position in regard to  
the IRT was left open by the Foreign  
Ministers Meeting in Berlin  
in August 1951 and temporary  
deferral was suggested by the  
Soviet side. Working Group  
on IRT has been made on  
countermeasures and has  
submitted the working  
draft.

An appeal on the General  
Assembly has not been de-  
clared open.

Continued on the reverse page

Re-surrender of  
the IRT. There  
are a great many  
examples of the IRT  
can be in this field.  
That effect is to  
be a result of  
the IRT. The IRT  
is a result of  
the IRT.

Accept such arrange-  
ments as to the IRT  
that access is for all  
useful purposes for  
all.

Protect against by  
German Government on  
such occasion of signi-  
cant harassment.

Under by agreement  
to the IRT. The IRT  
is a result of  
the IRT. The IRT  
is a result of  
the IRT.

The principal decision  
involved here, which  
has not definitely  
been made, is whether  
to use the IRT in  
any case (see other draft  
of German action). Since  
admission of this side  
is likely at some stage,  
a general decision to  
principle in this area  
would be useful.



Statement of the Crisis	Background	Countermeasures	Article 12 Decision	Comments
		<p>measures. It would be well for the link between international trade and access to Berlin to be emphasized by some limited trade retaliation.</p> <p>Minor Allied countermeasures might be adopted initially to keep the Soviets and GDR against further encroachment on construction of economic activities, and helping to strengthen the basic Allied position. It remains a viable West Berlin, increasingly severe measures should be avoided.</p>	<p>Specific decisions on the protest statements and the use of Allied countermeasures in this situation have not been taken.</p>	
<p>2. Blockade of rail, road or barge traffic, or two or all of them.</p>	<p>If German traffic is restricted by a measure of this sort as a means to bring levels sufficient to allow transit of goods, an Allied oil-burner strike would be begun to take up the balance of the freight and passenger.</p>	<p>Protest suggested by German Government.</p> <p>Protest by the Ambassador in Bonn to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn Berlin. If the measures cover all or almost all traffic, an Allied protest should be made in Moscow.</p> <p>Reduction of trade under the LCI arrangements with regard to the blockade, other means to be used to meet coal blockade.</p>	<p>None of the countermeasures suggested has been discussed or agreed. It would be well to decide on one of the eight or a partial scale of such a purpose.</p> <p>In addition the question of LCI involvement will have to be determined as will the desirability of using Allied countermeasures advised.</p>	

Situation in the Crisis	Background	Countermeasures	Article 12 Decision	Comments
		<p>measures. It would be well for the link between international trade and access to Berlin to be emphasized by some limited trade retaliation.</p> <p>Minor Allied countermeasures might be adopted initially to keep the Soviets and GDR against further encroachment on construction of economic activities, and helping to strengthen the basic Allied position. It remains a viable West Berlin, increasingly severe measures should be avoided.</p>	<p>Specific decisions on the protest statements and the use of Allied countermeasures in this situation have not been taken.</p>	
<p>2. Blockade of rail, road or barge traffic, or two or all of them.</p>	<p>If German traffic is restricted by a measure of this sort as a means to bring levels sufficient to allow transit of goods, an Allied policy which would be begun to take on the balance of the freight and passenger.</p>	<p>Protest suggested by German Government.</p> <p>Protest by the Ambassador in Bonn to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn Berlin. If the measures cover all or almost all traffic, an Allied protest should be made in Moscow.</p> <p>Reduction of trade under the GTR arrangements with regard to the blockade, other means to be used to meet road blockade.</p>	<p>None of the countermeasures suggested has been discussed or agreed. It would be well to decide on one of the eight or a partial scale of such a purpose.</p> <p>In addition the question of IET involvement will have to be determined as will the desirability of using Allied countermeasures advised.</p>	

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Development in the Crisis	Response	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
C Blockage of both Allied and German ground access, air access still being	Commence airlift (SBAI)	Allied countermeasures should be provided if the partial blockage is serious enough. (See Annex <u>A</u> )  Economic countermeasures amounting to a total embargo will be taken, including cancellation of IZT agreement. See Annex <u>B</u> for a list of the countermeasures envisaged (these are the measures in Annex A of the Paris Working Group report).	partial blockage of German access (total blockage would presumably call for such measures, though no specific decision to this effect has been made)  The economic countermeasures were agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris in August 1961.	
		An approach to the UN Security Council will be made.	No definite decision has been taken in recommending the UN at this stage. It should be made in principle with a final decision subject to the conditions existing at the time.	
		Additional Allied countermeasures would be taken (see Annex <u>B</u> )	Specific decisions as to the carrying out of military activity in this eventuality have not been made. (See II a 3).	
		Military activity will have to be considered of a nature which, if blockage persists, would evolve into the use of force.		

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Development in the Crisis	Response	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
C Blockage of both Allied and German ground access, air access still being	Commence airlift (SBAI)	Allied countermeasures should be provided if the partial blockage is serious enough. (See Annex <u>A</u> )  Economic countermeasures amounting to a total embargo will be taken, including cancellation of IZT agreement. See Annex <u>B</u> for a list of the countermeasures envisaged (these are the measures in Annex A of the Paris Working Group report).	partial blockage of German access (total blockage would presumably call for such measures, though no specific decision to this effect has been made)  The economic countermeasures were agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris in August 1961.	
		An approach to the UN Security Council will be made.	No definite decision has been taken in recommending the UN at this stage. It should be made in principle with a final decision subject to the conditions existing at the time.	
		Additional Allied countermeasures would be taken (see Annex <u>B</u> )	Specific decisions as to the carrying out of military activity in this eventuality have not been made. (See II a 3).	
		Military activity will have to be considered of a nature which, if blockage persists, would evolve into the use of force.		

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Incidents in the CrisisResponseCommentsState of DecisionComments

1. Blockage of both Allied  
and German ground access,  
air access being closed.

Institute an effort to  
reopen access on the  
ground.

Same as II A 4 above  
(IZT cancellation be-  
ing included in this  
case)

The decisions concern-  
ing the military opera-  
tion described in II A 5  
apply here.

September 1, 1950

Incidents in the CrisisResponseCommentsState of DecisionComments

1. Blockage of both Allied  
and German ground access,  
air access being closed.

Institute an effort to  
reopen access on the  
ground.

Same as II A 4 above  
(IZT cancellation be-  
ing included in this  
case)

The decisions concern-  
ing the military opera-  
tion described in II A 5  
apply here.

September 1, 1950



<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
II. Harassments within Berlin				
A. Interference with Allied Access to East Berlin				
1. Harassment but not denial of Allied entry into East Berlin.				
a. East German police demand to see identification or other documents of uniformed personnel in an official vehicle, attempt to search the vehicle, etc.	<p>The personnel involved should refuse to comply and should demand to see a Soviet officer. If the latter appears, they should insist that they be permitted to pass. If necessary, they may show an identifying document to the Soviet officer. No other control is to be permitted.</p> <p>If a Soviet officer is not called or if he makes an unacceptable demand, the vehicle should proceed through the checkpoint unless physically prevented or unless to do so would result in injury to someone.</p> <p>For the event the vehicle cannot proceed, see III A2 below.</p>	If a Soviet officer appears and permits the vehicle to proceed, no countermeasures are called for.	This is at present US procedure. It is understood that the French procedures are similar but that those of British military personnel are not identical.	<p>It is considered that the practices of the three countries with respect to the question of identification procedure should not be changed at this time to make them uniform.</p>

<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
II. Harassments within Berlin				
A. Interference with Allied Access to East Berlin				
1. Harassment but not denial of Allied entry into East Berlin.				
a. East German police demand to see identification or other documents of uniformed personnel in an official vehicle, attempt to search the vehicle, etc.	<p>The personnel involved should refuse to comply and should demand to see a Soviet officer. If the latter appears, they should insist that they be permitted to pass. If necessary, they may show an identifying document to the Soviet officer. No other control is to be permitted.</p> <p>If a Soviet officer is not called or if he makes an unacceptable demand, the vehicle should proceed through the checkpoint unless physically prevented or unless to do so would result in injury to someone.</p> <p>For the event the vehicle cannot proceed, see III A2 below.</p>	If a Soviet officer appears and permits the vehicle to proceed, no countermeasures are called for.	This is at present US procedure. It is understood that the French procedures are similar but that those of British military personnel are not identical.	It is considered that the practices of the three countries with respect to the question of identification procedure should not be changed at this time to make them uniform.

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1. (Continued)				
b. East German police demand to see identification or other documents of official Allied civilian personnel in official Allied vehicles or private vehicles with USAREUR (or respective UK or French) license plates, or demand to search the vehicle, etc.	An identifying document should be shown. It should not be handed to the East German police; however, if this does not suffice, a Soviet officer should be called. In other respects the response is the same as in A1 a above.	If the vehicle is allowed to proceed by the East German police or the Soviet officer under the prescribed conditions, no countermeasures are required.		At present US Mission personnel do not show identification except in rare cases and under protest. This should be continued as long as possible, but ultimately the US would accept the requirement of showing identification regularly.
c. (1) East German police halt Allied military or civilian official personnel, in official or officially licensed vehicle, within East Berlin.	The same initial procedure should be followed by these two categories of personnel as at the checkpoints. The vehicle should contact its headquarters if it has a radio.	If the vehicle is allowed to proceed under the prescribed conditions, no countermeasures are required.		
(2) The vehicle is not permitted to proceed, and a Soviet officer is not called.	The vehicle should proceed unless physically prevented or unless to do so would involve injury to someone. If the vehicle cannot proceed, personnel should remain in the vehicle and stay where they are, repeating demands to see a Soviet officer. When it becomes imperative for reasons of health or comfort, the personnel may comply under protest with demands upon them	A protest should be made by the Commandants. If the vehicle is held until the personnel must comply, the Allied Commandants should take appropriate countermeasures, such as detaining a Soviet vehicle in West Berlin (other than BASC or Spandau personnel).	It should be assured that the Commandants have authorization to take the proposed countermeasures. (US and UK consider that the Commandant should have such authority, and discussions are taking place on the question in Berlin.)	

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1. (Continued)				
b. East German police demand to see identification or other documents of official Allied civilian personnel in official Allied vehicles or private vehicles with USAREUR (or respective UK or French) license plates, or demand to search the vehicle, etc.	An identifying document should be shown. It should not be handed to the East German police; however, if this does not suffice, a Soviet officer should be called. In other respects the response is the same as in A1 a above.	If the vehicle is allowed to proceed by the East German police or the Soviet officer under the prescribed conditions, no countermeasures are required.		At present US Mission personnel do not show identification except in rare cases and under protest. This should be continued as long as possible, but ultimately the US would accept the requirement of showing identification regularly.
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(2) The vehicle is not permitted to proceed, and a Soviet officer is not called.	The vehicle should proceed unless physically prevented or unless to do so would involve injury to someone. If the vehicle cannot proceed, personnel should remain in the vehicle and stay where they are, repeating demands to see a Soviet officer. When it becomes imperative for reasons of health or comfort, the personnel may comply under protest with demands upon them	A protest should be made by the Commandants. If the vehicle is held until the personnel must comply, the Allied Commandants should take appropriate countermeasures, such as detaining a Soviet vehicle in West Berlin (other than BASC or Spandau personnel).	It should be assured that the Commandants have authorization to take the proposed countermeasures. (US and UK consider that the Commandant should have such authority, and discussions are taking place on the question in Berlin.)	

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Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
1. (Continued)				
c. (3) The East German police demand that the vehicle accompany them to a police station, etc.	The Allied personnel should refuse, and follow the same procedure as in c (2) above. In this event, however, acceding to demands will mean ultimately going to an East German office with the police. If this occurs, the personnel should refuse to deal with the East Germans and demand to be put in touch with Soviet officials and to contact their own headquarters. In extricating them, Allied headquarters should deal only with the Soviets.	Arrest of Allied personnel by East Germans is more serious than unacceptable controls on their passage. A stronger protest should be made, and a Soviet vehicle (but not BASC or Spandau) should be detained until release is secured. If serious harassment of this sort continues, the question will arise whether to take more far-reaching countermeasures. An initial step might be denying entry to all War Memorial guards and arresting those currently in West Berlin.	It should be assured that the Commandants have authorization to take the proposed countermeasures. (US and UK consider that the Commandants should have such authority, and discussions are taking place on the question in Berlin.)	
2. Denial of Allied Access to East Berlin.				
a. All Allied military or official civilian personnel are prevented from passing the crossing point,	The Allied vehicle should withdraw and report to its headquarters. While other measures are taking place,	The Allied Commandants should protest to the Soviet Commandant and the Ambassadors at Bonn	US and UK Commandants have authority to protest. Ambassadorial protest is subject to	This is not considered a "vital" Allied interest, but is closely related, in the context



Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
1. (Continued)				
c. (3) The East German police demand that the vehicle accompany them to a police station, etc.	The Allied personnel should refuse, and follow the same procedure as in c (2) above. In this event, however, acceding to demands will mean ultimately going to an East German office with the police. If this occurs, the personnel should refuse to deal with the East Germans and demand to be put in touch with Soviet officials and to contact their own headquarters. In extricating them, Allied headquarters should deal only with the Soviets.	Arrest of Allied personnel by East Germans is more serious than unacceptable controls on their passage. A stronger protest should be made, and a Soviet vehicle (but not BASC or Spandau) should be detained until release is secured. If serious harassment of this sort continues, the question will arise whether to take more far-reaching countermeasures. An initial step might be denying entry to all War Memorial guards and arresting those currently in West Berlin.	It should be assured that the Commandants have authorization to take the proposed countermeasures. (US and UK consider that the Commandants should have such authority, and discussions are taking place on the question in Berlin.)	
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a. All Allied military or official civilian personnel are prevented from passing the crossing point,	The Allied vehicle should withdraw and report to its headquarters. While other measures are taking place,	The Allied Commandants should protest to the Soviet Commandant and the Ambassadors at Bonn	US and UK Commandants have authority to protest. Ambassadorial protest is subject to	This is not considered a "vital" Allied interest, but is closely related, in the context



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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2. (Continued)				
or the crossing point is formally closed.	a military vehicle should present itself at regular intervals at the crossing point with the demand that it be allowed to proceed.	should protest to the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin.	decision by Governments at the time.	of the whole struggle over Berlin, to those interests which are considered "vital"
	(US instructions provide that a vehicle is "blocked" in this sense if it cannot proceed without injuring someone or without removing obstacles with bulldozers, tanks or demolition.)	All Soviet entry to West Berlin, except for BASC and Spandau personnel, should be prohibited. Other countermeasures within Berlin should be taken.	It is US policy to take the step of barring Soviet entry in this manner, subject to tripartite agreement. The US and UK have authorized their Commandants to reach tripartite agreement on this and other countermeasures in Berlin and to implement them on their own initiative when agreed.	
		Move additional military forces to the sector boundary area.	The US Commandant has this authority.	
		If the situation remains unchanged after 24 hours (or perhaps immediately in case of formal closing of boundary) one or all Allied Ambassadors in Moscow should protest	Decision to be made at the time by Governments.	

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2. (Continued)				
or the crossing point is formally closed.	a military vehicle should present itself at regular intervals at the crossing point with the demand that it be allowed to proceed.	should protest to the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin.	decision by Governments at the time.	of the whole struggle over Berlin, to those interests which are considered "vital"
	(US instructions provide that a vehicle is "blocked" in this sense if it cannot proceed without injuring someone or without removing obstacles with bulldozers, tanks or demolition.)	All Soviet entry to West Berlin, except for BASC and Spandau personnel, should be prohibited. Other countermeasures within Berlin should be taken.	It is US policy to take the step of barring Soviet entry in this manner, subject to tripartite agreement. The US and UK have authorized their Commandants to reach tripartite agreement on this and other countermeasures in Berlin and to implement them on their own initiative when agreed.	
		Move additional military forces to the sector boundary area.	The US Commandant has this authority.	
		If the situation remains unchanged after 24 hours (or perhaps immediately in case of formal closing of boundary) one or all Allied Ambassadors in Moscow should protest	Decision to be made at the time by Governments.	

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2. (Continued)		to Gromyko or Khrushchev, warning that this is a serious breach of 4- power responsibilities.		
	If after 24 hours no change occurs, countermeasures should be taken outside the context of circulation within Berlin: Annex A		It is US policy that such measures would be contemplated. Other Governments have this question for consideration.	Countermeasures in the context of circulation in Berlin would seem justified in this case even though they would be unlikely to effect opening of the boundary. They would be needed to show our will and ability to react to Soviet encroachment generally. They should be of such a nature that they could be maintained throughout the crisis.
	(The question of a complete TTD ban at this stage is being discussed in Bonn )			
	The Czech and Polish Missions should be harassed and perhaps expelled.		It is US policy, subject to Tripartite agreement, to expel the Missions. US and UK Commandants have authority to reach such agreement in Berlin and implement it on their own initiative when agreed.	

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2. (Continued)		to Gromyko or Khrushchev, warning that this is a serious breach of 4- power responsibilities.		
	If after 24 hours no change occurs, countermeasures should be taken outside the context of circulation within Berlin: Annex A		It is US policy that such measures would be contemplated. Other Governments have this question for consideration.	Countermeasures in the context of circulation in Berlin would seem justified in this case even though they would be unlikely to effect opening of the boundary. They would be needed to show our will and ability to react to Soviet encroachment generally. They should be of such a nature that they could be maintained throughout the crisis.
	(The question of a complete TTD ban at this stage is being discussed in Bonn )			
	The Czech and Polish Missions should be harassed and perhaps expelled.		It is US policy, subject to Tripartite agreement, to expel the Missions. US and UK Commandants have authority to reach such agreement in Berlin and implement it on their own initiative when agreed.	

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
B Interference with West German and West Berliner access to East Berlin.				
1 Further restriction on but not denial of entry of West Germans or West Berliners into East Berlin.		<p>If the restriction is severe and affects West Germans, the latter should point out to the East Germans through the usual IZT channel that inter-zonal trade is related to movement within Berlin. Perhaps steps could be taken within the terms of the IZT agreement to require payment of outstanding credits in certain categories before further shipments can be made. (Re IZT see Annex D)</p> <p>(Possible use of selective restriction of issuance of TTDs in the trade category is being considered in Bonn).</p>	<p>A decision should be taken whether to involve IZT at all in the question of circulation within Berlin. It was the opinion of the Foreign Ministers in Paris that IZT should not be used extensively except when German civilian traffic to Berlin was interfered with.</p>	<p>Action by the East Germans to bar West Germans and West Berliners from East Berlin cannot be affected materially by any feasible Western countermeasures. The effort of the West should thus be to make clear that it regards such action as part of the general campaign against West Berlin and that it will respond with more vigorous retaliation if further steps are taken in that campaign. It would thus be well to establish the link with IZT even in the absence of intent to use it significantly in these circumstances.</p>
2 a Denial of entry of West Germans and West Berliners to East Berlin.		<p>The German Government should issue a protest statement.</p> <p>The Commandants should protest at once.</p>		

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
B Interference with West German and West Berliner access to East Berlin.				
1 Further restriction on but not denial of entry of West Germans or West Berliners into East Berlin.		<p>If the restriction is severe and affects West Germans, the latter should point out to the East Germans through the usual IZT channel that inter-zonal trade is related to movement within Berlin. Perhaps steps could be taken within the terms of the IZT agreement to require payment of outstanding credits in certain categories before further shipments can be made. (Re IZT see Annex D)</p> <p>(Possible use of selective restriction of issuance of TTDs in the trade category is being considered in Bonn).</p>	<p>A decision should be taken whether to involve IZT at all in the question of circulation within Berlin. It was the opinion of the Foreign Ministers in Paris that IZT should not be used extensively except when German civilian traffic to Berlin was interfered with.</p>	<p>Action by the East Germans to bar West Germans and West Berliners from East Berlin cannot be affected materially by any feasible Western countermeasures. The effort of the West should thus be to make clear that it regards such action as part of the general campaign against West Berlin and that it will respond with more vigorous retaliation if further steps are taken in that campaign. It would thus be well to establish the link with IZT even in the absence of intent to use it significantly in these circumstances.</p>
2 a Denial of entry of West Germans and West Berliners to East Berlin.		<p>The German Government should issue a protest statement.</p> <p>The Commandants should protest at once.</p>		

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
B. 2.a. (Continued)		<p>The German Government should take whatever steps are available to make the carrying out of the IZT agreement more difficult for the East Germans without however actually making other than minor cancellations in deliveries.</p> <p>(Possible use of selective restriction of issuance of TFDs in the trade category is being considered in Bonn.)</p>	<p>A decision on taking measures in the context of the IZT has not been made. The two forms of protest have not been specifically decided upon.</p>	
b. Demand by GDR that West Germans and/or West Berliners obtain East German visas for entry into East Berlin.	Refuse to comply	<p>Same as above, plus possible NATO countermeasures (as in denial of Allied access). In addition, a higher level protest should be considered.</p>	<p>No decision on the countermeasure has been taken.</p>	<p>It is considered that such a GDR request for <u>de jure</u> recognition is more serious than closing the boundary alone.</p>
C Harassment of or attack upon West Berlin.				
1. East German psychological, economic or political harassment of West Berlin.				

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
B. 2.a. (Continued)		<p>The German Government should take whatever steps are available to make the carrying out of the IZT agreement more difficult for the East Germans without however actually making other than minor cancellations in deliveries.</p> <p>(Possible use of selective restriction of issuance of TFDs in the trade category is being considered in Bonn.)</p>	<p>A decision on taking measures in the context of the IZT has not been made. The two forms of protest have not been specifically decided upon.</p>	
b. Demand by GDR that West Germans and/or West Berliners obtain East German visas for entry into East Berlin.	Refuse to comply	<p>Same as above, plus possible NATO countermeasures (as in denial of Allied access). In addition, a higher level protest should be considered.</p>	<p>No decision on the countermeasure has been taken.</p>	<p>It is considered that such a GDR request for <u>de jure</u> recognition is more serious than closing the boundary alone.</p>
C Harassment of or attack upon West Berlin.				
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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C 1. (continued)				
a. Psychological harassment and disturbances:				
Increase in psychological "warfare" against West Berlin especially in critical periods of political tension by means of TV, radio, rumors, subversion.	This might be dealt with over the long run by a committee set up in Washington or Berlin to keep this problem under consideration together with the general question of Berlin <i>raison d'etre</i> and morale.		No decision has been made on such a committee.	West Berlin and West German authorities note that this psychological "warfare" has been increased considerably after August 13 - especially in the field of radio and television propaganda and with regard to rumors.
b. Economic harassment and disturbances within Berlin:				
1. Supply of food	Substitution by supplies from Federal Republic	Protest	No decision has been made on the countermeasures. The response presumably requires no specific advance decision.	See Annex _____ for information on the effect of such harassment on the problem of providing supplies via access routes to West Berlin. With respect to countermeasures, their employment will be affected by the degree to which harassments are cumulative and result therefore in a more serious situation than sporadic or isolated harassment would create.
Halting of Soviet zone deliveries of sugar, pork and potatoes under IZT.	at any given moment, as long as access open.	Selective harassment in the field of IZT. (Re IZT see Annex D)		
		Selective economic countermeasures against Soviet Bloc, as a whole or the GDR alone,		



<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C 1. (continued)				
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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C. (Continued)				
2. Supply of other goods				
Soft coal and construction material, gasoline (Diesel)	Soft coal could not easily be replaced by West German deliveries.	See III. 1.b		There are strategic stores for raw material and products for higher consumption for approximately 9 months (coal one year).  West Berlin has almost no raw materials of its own and thus is almost fully dependent on deliveries from other sources (East Germany and Federal Republic).  See Annex _____.
3. Railroad and locks operation				
Soviet zone and East Berlin supply services in connection with railroad operations in Berlin and with regard to locks in Berlin (Rothensee). Railroad as well as locks are operated by East German administration. Dis-	Transfer to road traffic insofar as possible would become necessary	West Berlin would be in a position to flood zone areas or East Berlin areas in case of seizure of the locks by West Berlin.  Also it is to be noted that countermeasures against East German and Soviet Bloc barges on the West German canal and water system are conceiv-	Such countermeasures as flooding of certain areas will have to be studied in Berlin.  No decision has been made regarding countermeasures under these circumstances	The Soviet zone is in a position to terminate railroad operation in West Berlin without serious disturbances of its own railroad system (a complete railroad system around the city is available to the zone authorities). Soviet zone barge operation across the sector boundary has been

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C. (Continued)				
2. Supply of other goods				
Soft coal and construction material, gasoline (Diesel)	Soft coal could not easily be replaced by West German deliveries.	See III. 1.b		There are strategic stores for raw material and products for higher consumption for approximately 9 months (coal one year).  West Berlin has almost no raw materials of its own and thus is almost fully dependent on deliveries from other sources (East Germany and Federal Republic).  See Annex _____.
3. Railroad and locks operation				
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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C 3. (Continued)				
turbances with West Berlin barges are conceivable notably at the locks.		able and remain to be studied. Also see III, 1.b		terminated on August 13.
		Additional non-military countermeasures should be envisaged.	The possibility of diverting trains to East Berlin should be studied in Bonn and Berlin.	It is possible to direct all Western supply trains to East Berlin railroad station and thus harass considerably free deliveries to West Berlin. Allied train traffic could conceivably be affected in this way.
4. S-Bahn operation in West Berlin. (termination)	West Berlin authorized extend bus services.	See III, 1.b.	Readiness to make response should be assured in Berlin.	As a spontaneous public reaction the number of S-Bahn users in West Berlin has decreased from a daily rate of 500,000 to 100 000 since August 13 (estimate).
5. Supply of gas; electric power and water. There is a gas pipeline from Salzgitter/West Germany to Borsig-factory in West Berlin which could be cut off easily.	West Berlin gas suppliers could substitute easily.			There is no longer any supply of these services from East Berlin or Soviet zone.

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C 3. (Continued)				
turbances with West Berlin barges are conceivable notably at the locks.		able and remain to be studied. Also see III, 1.b		terminated on August 13.
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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C (Continued)				
6. Sewage				
It is to be noted that in the field of sewage there is joint West-and East Berlin system. Separation of this joint system is unlikely.	Nevertheless precautionary measures have been taken (5 000 tons chlorine are stocked in Berlin) in order to assure proper sewage.			
7. Disturbances of telecommunication and radio systems between West Berlin and the Federal Republic or other Western countries.	Reduce communications to most important traffic as necessary.  Utilize limited ECCM to maintain communications disregarding assigned frequencies.  Station VHF/UHF relay aircraft in the corridor.	See III, 1.b  It is to be noted that the East German radio-TV system which is equipped by Siemens depends on regular supplies of essential operational parts from West Berlin. This is a field where retaliation or countermeasures could be applied under certain circumstances.  Stop payment of due costs to East German System through West German Bundespost.	No decisions have been taken on responses or countermeasures.	US experts consider that, with utilization of the techniques referred to, Berlin cannot be blacked out without unacceptable interference with Soviet/GDR transmissions.   German experts point out that the wireless communication system between West Berlin and the Federal Republic does not depend on relay stations in the Soviet zone; however, jamming is possible. The cable communication system

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C (Continued)				
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7. Disturbances of telecommunication and radio systems between West Berlin and the Federal Republic or other Western countries.	<p>Reduce communications to most important traffic as necessary.</p> <p>Utilize limited ECCM to maintain communications disregarding assigned frequencies.</p> <p>Station VHF/UHF relay aircraft in the corridor.</p>	<p>See III, 1.b</p> <p>It is to be noted that the East German radio-TV system which is equipped by Siemens depends on regular supplies of essential operational parts from West Berlin. This is a field where retaliation or countermeasures could be applied under certain circumstances.</p> <p>Stop payment of due costs to East German System through West German Bundespost.</p>	<p>No decisions have been taken on responses or countermeasures.</p>	<p>US experts consider that, with utilization of the techniques referred to, Berlin cannot be blacked out without unacceptable interference with Soviet/GDR transmissions.</p> <p>German experts point out that the wireless communication system between West Berlin and the Federal Republic does not depend on relay stations in the Soviet zone; however, jamming is possible. The cable communication system</p>

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C. 7. (Continued)				
c. Maintenance of blockage for workers and employees from East Berlin and Soviet zone to work in West Berlin.	West Berlin attempts to fill the gap by activation of labor reserves, by rationalizing production processes, and by attracting additional labor from West Germany.	Further studies necessary. Demand for free circulation within Berlin should be repeated constantly.	The problem is being dealt with by the West Berlin administration.	between West Berlin and the Federal Republic could be cut off; however, the cables are also used for Soviet Bloc communications to the West.
d. Political disturbances:				
Attempts to cut existing political legislative and administrative links with the Federal Republic.	Rejection of Soviet demands and assertion that existing links between FRG and West Berlin are in accordance with Four Power Status of Berlin.		This question is being considered in the context of the various programs indicated.	With reference to d.5. it should be noted that at present there are approximately 80 Federal German Boards and offices or agencies working in Berlin. They employ 18 000 officials and employees.
Essential elements of these links are, among others:	The Western responses and countermeasures will largely depend on the methods the Soviet Union will apply to erode this element of the viability of West Berlin, i.e. whether they act:			The re-transfer of these Federal German Boards
1) identity of political, legal and social-economic system of West Berlin and Federal Republic	1.) through psychological warfare (responses and countermeasures - See III. 1)			

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
C. 7. (Continued)				
c. Maintenance of blockage for workers and employees from East Berlin and Soviet zone to work in West Berlin.	West Berlin attempts to fill the gap by activation of labor reserves, by rationalizing production processes, and by attracting additional labor from West Germany.	Further studies necessary. Demand for free circulation within Berlin should be repeated constantly.	The problem is being dealt with by the West Berlin administration.	between West Berlin and the Federal Republic could be cut off; however, the cables are also used for Soviet Bloc communications to the West.
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1) identity of political, legal and social-economic system of West Berlin and Federal Republic	1.) through psychological warfare (responses and countermeasures - See III. 1)			

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Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
G. 7.d. (Continued)				
2) constitutional links; representation of West Berlin in Bundestag and Bundesrat and other forms of participation in the constitutional life of the Federal Republic	2.) through political pressure (responses and countermeasures - See Paris and Washington Working Group reports)			and agencies from Berlin to the Federal Republic would cause immense political and psychological problems.
3) adoption of Federal laws	3.) through air-access harassment (responses and countermeasures - see I A-D)			
4) foreign representation by the Federal Republic	4.) through negotiations (responses and countermeasures - see Paris and Washington Working Group reports)			
5) Federal authorities in Berlin	The German delegation intends to submit additional proposals in due course.			
6) meetings of Federal constitutional organs in Berlin				
7) free circulation of West Berliners in the Federal Republic and full participation in political life and public services and vice versa				

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Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
G. 7.d. (Continued)				
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5) Federal authorities in Berlin	The German delegation intends to submit additional proposals in due course.			
6) meetings of Federal constitutional organs in Berlin				
7) free circulation of West Berliners in the Federal Republic and full participation in political life and public services and vice versa				

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Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
c. 7. d. (Continued)				
8) application of Federal German system for passports and identification.				
e. Other Disturbances				
1) Harassment of West Berlin radio and TV stations.		Countermeasures in kind (see III 1.b7) further studies advisable.		
2) Maintenance of blockage for students from East Germany and Soviet zone to follow courses in West Berlin.	There are increased endeavours to have an increased number of West German students in Berlin.	Countermeasures in the field of cultural relations should be studied inasmuch as such contacts are not yet interrupted. Interference with contacts which are desirable from the point of view of the Federal Republic of Germany should be carefully avoided.		
3) Usage of S-Bahn and railroad installations for provocative and subversive action from East Berlin.	Increased vigilance of Allied and West Berlin authorities.			
It is possible to channel through the S-Bahn a great number of communists - or				

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Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
c. 7. d. (Continued)				
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1) Harassment of West Berlin radio and TV stations.		Countermeasures in kind (see III 1.b7) further studies advisable.		
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3) Usage of S-Bahn and railroad installations for provocative and subversive action from East Berlin.	Increased vigilance of Allied and West Berlin authorities.			
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Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
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C 7. d.3 (Continued)

even members of  
"Betriebskampfgruppen"  
or armed forces into  
West Berlin. (other  
forceful action see  
III C2)

4) Provocation by organizing sabotage acts against S-Bahn installations.	See previous item			
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5) Installation of Soviet zone offices and agencies in West Berlin	This has already been attempted. Immediate closure of such agencies has been ordered and should be done in future.			
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6) Provocation or incidents on the Sector boundary or the zonal border on West Berlin. (Other action of this nature see III. 1)	Allied military forces at the sector boundaries use firearms only in self-defense or while under fire from East Berlin, and respond with tear gas to attack with water, stones, etc.	Serious incidents or per- sistent provocation should be protested by the Com- mandants or the particular Commandant whose sector is involved.		
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The responses have been  
discussed by Allies Mis-  
sions in Berlin. Further  
discussions should be held  
there to coordinate "rules  
of engagement." Those de-  
scribed here are suggested  
as bases for such discussions.  
Protests of the nature men-  
tioned under countermeasures  
are being made as required  
by the situation.

7) Steinmuecken interruption of communication and access to Stein-	Transport residents and supplies to and from Steinstuecken by U.S. Army helicopters.	Protest and warning to Soviet Commandant and/or Soviet Ambassador		
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Response is firm U.S. policy.

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Developments in the Crisis	Responses	Countermeasures	Status of Decision	Comments
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C 7. d.3 (Continued)

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or armed forces into  
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forceful action see  
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scribed here are suggested  
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Protests of the nature men-  
tioned under countermeasures  
are being made as required  
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7) Steinmuecken interruption of communication and access to Stein-	Transport residents and supplies to and from Steinmuecken by U.S. Army helicopters.	Protest and warning to Soviet Commandant and/or Soviet Ambassador		
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Response is firm U.S. policy.

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
	Conduct MP patrol into Steinstuecken by vehicle or helicopter.		Protest authority delegated to Berlin commandants by US and UK.	
2 East German/Soviet move to seize West Berlin by force, or harassment by military means.				
a Harassment by shelling, etc., not associated with direct attempt to seize the city.	Planning not yet undertaken			Such action might occur as part of an effort to prevent use of West Berlin air fields.
b Overt attack by uniformed force.	North Atlantic Treaty provisions take effect.	NATO conducts appropriate military operations.	Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO Treaty provide for collective self-defense in the event of attack upon the territory of any of the Parties in Europe.	Planning for NATO operations being done by Gen. Norstad
	Berlin defense plan comes into effect.	Severe military and non-military countermeasures (Annex B).		
	Single Allied Commander for Allied forces in Berlin.			

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
	Conduct MP patrol into Steinstuecken by vehicle or helicopter.		Protest authority delegated to Berlin commandants by US and UK.	
2 East German/Soviet move to seize West Berlin by force, or harassment by military means.				
a Harassment by shelling, etc., not associated with direct attempt to seize the city.	Planning not yet undertaken			Such action might occur as part of an effort to prevent use of West Berlin air fields.
b Overt attack by uniformed force.	North Atlantic Treaty provisions take effect.	NATO conducts appropriate military operations.	Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO Treaty provide for collective self-defense in the event of attack upon the territory of any of the Parties in Europe.	Planning for NATO operations being done by Gen. Norstad
	Berlin defense plan comes into effect.	Severe military and non-military countermeasures (Annex B).		
	Single Allied Commander for Allied forces in Berlin.			

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<u>Developments in the Crisis</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>	<u>Status of Decision</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Covertly directed effort to infiltrate large numbers of activists, create widespread disorder, and seize control.	West Berlin police, including Force B, seek to suppress; Allied garrisons committed if necessary. Single Allied Commander for Allied forces in Berlin.		Three governments have agreed that Gen. Norstad can designate a single commander for Berlin in the event of a grave civil disturbance, on the joint recommendation of the three Commandants, if time does not permit reference to Governments.	
		Reinforce Berlin garrisons from Allied forces in FRG.	No common decision has been taken on reinforcement of Berlin. Gen. Norstad should be asked for recommendations.	Police and existing garrisons can deal with several scores of thousands of rioters. Little additional reinforcements should be needed, if any, to handle any conceivable civil disorder.
		Bring NATO forces to state of Reinforced Alert.		
		Take additional countermeasures beyond Central Europe (See Annex B).		

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Movements in the Crisis	Response	Countermeasures	Status of Decisions	Comments
A. Soviet political moves				
1. Announcement of a peace conference	Notes to Soviets from US, UK, France and Federal Republic sent and published	Representation to governments of all states invited to the conference to Berlin, as well as provision of guidance to the press	Agreed by Four Power Working Group and referred to governments	Draft of initial material for guidance and recommendations, and very confidential. The representative contacted to Berlin of February 10.
2. Signature of a peace treaty	Solenn statement by US, UK, France and Federal Republic	If it seems that Soviet withdrawal from functions of Allied access to Berlin is imminent, Soviets would presumably be given completed note re access, and public statement would be published	Same as above for response. The counter-measure has been approved qualitatively.	Draft of solenn statement sent to Berlin of February 10, 1961.
C. Decision of access control to the GDR	Instruction for Allied official vehicles and trains in this contingency case (see annex 1803-A). This order for Allied personnel to permit GDR checkpoint officials to receive and stamp their identity documents and movement orders, as the Soviet personnel now do. It also provides instruction for the event a greater degree of control is insisted upon by the GDR	Action described above could be taken	The measures and the countermeasures have been approved qualitatively.	

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Minor Countermeasures

Economic

1. The closure of Soviet Bloc trade missions, including Amtorg offices.
2. The refusal to enter into new contracts to charter shipping to Soviet Bloc Countries and suspend existing contracts.
3. The expansion of export control measures against the Soviet Bloc, including selective embargo. (Could be a major action depending on extent of control.)
4. The cut-off of selected types of industrial and technical exchanges in which Soviets are most interested and ban export of published and unpublished technical and scientific information.
5. The slowdown in issuance of export licenses and foreign exchange licensing for shipments to Soviet Bloc.
6. The cancellation of arrangements for Soviet participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Western countries (NATO).
7. The warning to NATO shipping and civil aircraft to avoid using Soviet Bloc harbors and airports.
8. The closure of frontiers to Soviet Bloc officials engaging in trade or commerce.
9. The cancellation of arrangements for Western (NATO) participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Soviet Bloc countries.

10. Prepare and implement countermeasures against USSR and "GDR" in form of tripartite controls over transport on basis equivalent to any Soviet or GDR harassments.

11. Restrain movement of personnel of Soviet trade missions, including Amtorg.

Other Non-military

1. Tighten controls over Soviet Bloc personnel at frontiers, ports, and airports as evidence of increased caution.
2. Refuse TID's to Soviet Bloc travelers either on blanket or selective basis.
3. Restrict circulation of Soviet Bloc officials and visitors over metropolitan territories.
4. Prohibit tourist travel of Soviet Bloc nationals.
5. Suspend or cancel cultural exchange agreements between Bloc and NATO countries.
6. Cut off selected types of industrial and technical exchanges in which Soviets are most interested and ban export of technical and scientific information.
7. In light of reactions to earlier stages, consider requesting neutral countries to make representations to USSR for removal of obstructions to Berlin access.

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Minor Countermeasures (Continued)

Military

1. Continue air surveillance along Greenland, Iceland, and UK line.
2. Execute anti-submarine surveillance at Straits of Gibraltar and in the Aegean Sea with visible patrolling.
3. Increase air activities (surveillance, military presence, etc.) along Soviet Bloc borders/radar barrier, utilizing resources of Far East Allies to the extent possible.
4. Assemble key tripartite/NATO commanders at Paris for readiness conference.
5. Augment military guards at autobahn checkpoints, on trains, and at Allied Airfields in Berlin.
6. Institute unilateral/tripartite military police patrols of the autobahn, on a 24-hour basis.
7. Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from Berlin in convoys escorted by armed MP's equipped with one-way communications equipment.
8. Increase utilization of the autobahn and air corridors to Berlin.
9. Increase stockpile of weapons, ammunition, and military supplies in Berlin.
10. Increase reconnaissance flights in the air corridors.
11. Implement appropriate alert measures in Europe to include:
  - a. Intensification of security against sabotage and subversion.
  - b. Reinforce frontiers.
  - c. Cancel routine out-of-area exercises and increase in-place exercises.
  - d. Intensify security restrictions on indigenous employment.
  - e. Increase air defense alert.
12. Control radio traffic to indicate increased alert, vary pattern of detectable communication activity.
13. Reinforce ADIZ measures.

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Major Countermeasures

The prohibition of the use of all financial facilities of the NATO countries to carry on current transactions with the USSR, the Soviet Zone of Germany, the other Soviet Bloc members and their nationals.

The expulsion of all Soviet Bloc technical experts and foreign trade officials without diplomatic immunity from the NATO countries.

The freezing of all assets of the members of the Soviet Bloc under jurisdiction of the NATO powers.

Termination of trade agreements involving Soviet Bloc countries.

The denial of all exports to Soviet Bloc countries.

The stoppage of all imports from Soviet Bloc countries to NATO countries.

The closure of NATO ports to Soviet Bloc shipping and planes and Soviet Bloc chartering.

The prohibition of aircraft of Soviet Bloc countries from making transit overflights and technical stops.

The prohibition of calling at Soviet Bloc ports of vessels and planes of the NATO countries.

Other Non-Military

1. Intensely surveillance of Soviet Bloc fishing fleets in North Atlantic and North Pacific.

Measures amounting to a total economic embargo (Annex 1 of Section 9 of the Paris Working Group report).

2. Discourage tourist and nonessential traffic in Europe.
3. Restrict replacement and augmentation of personnel in Soviet Bloc embassies.
4. Close frontiers to all Soviet Bloc officials and visitors.
5. Ban Soviet Bloc radio broadcasts.

Military

1. Deploy additional forces (infantry and armor) overseas.
2. Increase air mobility in Europe (fighter and troop transport).
3. Seventh Air Force conduct exercises in Europe.
4. Sixth Fleet to conduct carrier operations in central and eastern Mediterranean.
5. Conduct tripartite exercises easily identifiable with the problem of forcing access to Berlin via the autobahn.
6. Establish anti-submarine carrier patrol along Greenland-Iceland-UK line.
7. Increase SAC degree of alert by utilizing airborne alert (currently on SAC ground alert).
8. Increase air defense alert, COMUS.
9. Alert additional Reserve component units.
10. Close Panama Canal to Bloc shipping.

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11. Move elements of 2d Fleet to war stations (Northern European waters).
12. Augmentation of ASW forces in the Mediterranean.
13. Intensify atomic training in all military forces.
14. Conduct submarine exercises in Mediterranean, North Atlantic and/or Pacific.
15. Execute overseas aircraft squadron dispersal plan.
16. Execute naval countermeasures against Bloc shipping:
  - a. Blockade Bloc shipping in Black Sea (requires Allied support to be successful).
  - b. Blockade in North Sea exits from the Baltic (requires Allied support to be successful).
  - c. Seize Soviet ships in the Western Pacific and in the vicinity of Cuba.
  - d. Announce a "Declaration of Contraband" prohibiting shipment of Communist arms and munitions into Cuba.
  - e. Announce a "Declaration of denial of free passage to Soviet and Bloc ships."
  - f. Discreet mining operations.
  - g. Seize US lend lease ships possessed by the USSR.
17. Disperse CONUS forces.

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ANNEX C

COUNTERMEASURES FOR INTERFERENCE

WITH AIR ACCESS

1. Closure of NATO Airports to Soviet Bloc aircraft;
2. Prevention of transit overflights and technical stops by Soviet bloc aircraft in NATO countries;
3. Prohibition against NATO country aircraft calling at Soviet Bloc airports.

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The Interzonal Trade Agreement\*

1.) Agreements

The Interzonal Trade Agreement was signed in Berlin on 29th December 1960. By this agreement the following earlier agreements and accords were reinstated:

- a) Interzonal Trade Agreement of 20th September 1951 including all annexes and supplementary accords.
- b) The accords of 16th August 1960.

2.) Volume of Interzonal Trade

Volume of interzonal trade in 1960: DM 1.6 Billion - i.e., DM 800 Millions worth of trade was carried on with the Soviet Zone in either direction.

3.) Junctim

At the signing of the agreement on 29th December 1960, both sides agreed on the following as a basis for transactions under the Agreement:

- a) The agreement deals with transportation matters only. Thus, political questions are left out, - i.e., Four-Power responsibility for Berlin is not affected thereby.
- b) Prerequisite:  
Unimpeded movement of passengers and goods between Berlin and the Federal Republic, and within Berlin.
- c) The passengers permit regulation issued by the zonal authorities on 8th September 1960 is not in fact being applied, - i.e., it has not been repealed formally.
- d) The zonal authorities have agreed to the sealing of trucks and - as far as possible - of ships in transit. This procedure means a considerable simplification.
- a) Our concession to the zonal authorities:
  - aa) Permission for West German firms to attend the Leipzig Fair.
  - bb) Members of the staff of Soviet zonal foreign trade enterprises are not interfered with in pursuit of their business activities in the Federal Republic.

\*This paper submitted by the German delegation.

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On the basis of the new accords it is possible for the Federal Government at any time to cancel goods consignment papers for individual consignments or for special types of goods. In the negotiations with the zonal authorities our side expressly stated that such cancellation would be affected in the event of interference with movements to or within Berlin. As is known, the Federal Republic has not availed itself of this right of cancellation.

#### 4.) Evaluation

As a result of this junctim, an economic reorganization leading to an ever decreasing dependence on supplies from the Federal Republic has taken place in the Soviet Zone. Experience over the last few months has shown (although figures are not available here to support this conclusion) that quotas of goods listed under No. 1 Account - especially iron and steel products as well as machinery - have not been fully taken up, nor have the long-term contracts required for this purpose been concluded. This development has deprived us to a considerable degree of the means of pressure which the interzonal trade agreement hitherto enabled us to bring to bear.

As was shown above, the zonal authorities clearly have violated the junctim implied in the interzonal trade agreement since 13th August 1961; nevertheless we have refrained from denouncing the interzonal trade agreement or from cancellation of the goods consignment papers because of the danger of escalation arising therefrom. For this reason, the other three powers have not adopted our proposal of selective restriction of trade.

The volume of West Berlin's present supplies from the Soviet Zone is as follows:

1960: DM 181 Million

First quarter of 1961: DM 41.1 Million

The viability of West Berlin does not depend on these supplies.

The commercial interest of German business in interzonal trade is small: the Federal Republic's entire East-West trade amounting to DM 4.2 Billion plus interzonal trade amounting to DM 2 Billion represents a mere 7 Per Cent of our total foreign trade.

It should be pointed out once more that as a result of the above-mentioned shift of the Soviet Zone's most important West German supplies to other countries, the effectiveness of denouncing the interzonal trade agreement has been substantially reduced.

The argument is thus all the more compelling that cessation of interzonal trade can be successful only if all NATO countries stop their supplies to the Soviet Zone.

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